Shareholder cultivation in age stakeholder capitalism requires management to recognize steward shareholders and foster symbiotic relationships using them. The authors offer four sets of tools managers may use to cultivate steward shareholders. These tools are classified into four types predicated on two dimensions: time-to-efficacy, which identifies the time necessary for the tactics to take effect, and implementation difficulty, which concerns resource demands and potential resistance managers may face in undertaking the tactics. Using these four sets of tools, managers can create a base of steward shareholders which are sure to provide their support for companies stakeholder-centered initiatives.
In 2021, Danones board of directors, under great pressure from activist Bluebell Capital and Artisan Partners, ousted the companys CEO Emmanuel Faber a longtime advocate of stakeholder capitalism. This decision puzzled many observers; in a day and time where in fact the business community appears to be readily embracing stakeholder capitalism, Faber and Danone were stalwarts. Now Unilever another stakeholder-centered consumer goods darling is under similar strain from a far more well-equipped and seasoned activist investor, Nelson Peltz.
These predicaments companies are increasingly finding themselves in with activist investors are disrupting the stakeholder agenda and costing CEOs their jobs. However they shouldn’t surprise us.
Steadily rising societal expectations are pushing companies to place their stakeholders first, and shareholders second however, many shareholders aren’t having it. Companies that dont adhere to the stakeholder capitalism agenda are quickly sanctioned by consumer groups and the media; and CEOs who flunk may become instant pariahs. Consequently, companies are quick to boast their corporate purpose and returns they expect from their newly designed stakeholder-centered strategies while neglecting that lots of shareholders still concentrate on firms near-term stock returns. When those stakeholder-centered initiatives appear short in translating into expected stock price improvements, management can lose support from shareholders which activists are waiting to capitalize.
The support for corporate stakeholder-centered strategies will be greatly enhanced if managers retooled their shareholder management to align making use of their stakeholder strategies. In doing this, the energy activists wield to undermine such strategies would also greatly diminish.
The original method of shareholder management has involved preparing a carefully scripted narrative in regards to a companys strategy and broadcasting the story widely to a diverse group of prospective investors, typically through mission statements, annual reports, and investor roadshows.
However, in todays era of stakeholder capitalism and investor activism, a narrative-first approach is insufficient to increase shareholder support also to avoid the kind of activist debacles Danone and Unilever and many more have recently found themselves in.
A primary oversight of a narrative-first approach is that it can most to attract shareholders that are tempted by the returns of stakeholder-centered strategies as opposed to the long-term business vision. Understandably so, optimistic managers often overclaim the expected returns from their flavor-of-the-day ESG (environment-social-governance) plans, luring in whatever shareholder fish are drawn to the promise of high shareholder returns from their plans.
Yet, such shareholders who give consideration (and also trade) on these messages are the kind of shareholders who is able to make it problematic for managers to devise and implement stakeholder initiatives effectively. These shareholders are quickly unforgiving of an integral intertemporal bind managers often end up in with stakeholder-centered strategies: Such plans may take substantial time and energy to produce far but uncertain returns. Therefore, when managers oversell stakeholder-centered initiatives, shareholders drawn to those messages can easily become discontent when those strategies appear short or dont produce results fast enough. Shareholders who’ve not become strong supporters of the business enterprise will slowly withdraw or worse, lend their support to an activist entrant with an improved plan.
A narrative-first approach creates another significant problem: It could be utilized by activists to swing indexers (along with other neutral shareholders) against management. With the rise of passive investing by index funds, many shareholders have limited by no fascination with understanding the a large number of firms they hold within their portfolios, and little loyalty to any given company. Many outsource their voting entirely to proxy advisors. Accordingly, when stakeholder initiatives flunk, activists can (and can, as evidenced by Danone and Unilever) use managers promises of shareholder returns that never materialized against them.
As stakeholder capitalism collides with shareholder primacy, shareholder cultivation becomes a much-needed treatment for this bind managers end up in.
Shareholder cultivation requires managing shareholder relationships so to attract and retain steward shareholders offering not merely long-term capital but additionally advice and counsel that’s critical to ongoing corporate success. Steward shareholders can benefit firms in age stakeholder capitalism for three reasons. First, these shareholders reduce firm stock price volatility. Steward shareholders concentrate on long-term stock returns and can not trade as readily on negative news, providing management with patient capital. Second, steward shareholders help companies identify effective stakeholder management initiatives. As stewards choose few portfolio firms, sometimes only 1 to two dozen, this enables these shareholders to build up rich insights into which stakeholder management initiatives work effectively. Third, as short-term shareholders may follow steward shareholders within their trading strategies, trusting them aswell informed, ownership by stewards might help foster an overarching sense of confidence in general management that cuts across shareholder types.
The bottom line is, shareholder cultivation in age stakeholder capitalism requires management to recognize steward shareholders and foster symbiotic relationships using them.
Cultivating Steward Shareholders
You can expect four sets of tools managers may use to cultivate steward shareholders. These tools are classified into four types predicated on two dimensions: time-to-efficacy, which identifies the time necessary for the tactics to take effect, and implementation difficulty, which concerns resource demands and potential resistance managers may face in undertaking the tactics.
1. Leveraging tools
By leveraging existing relationships, managers can engage existing steward shareholders to recognize and attract additional stewards. Managers may also appoint independent directors who also serve as directors of firms with substantial holdings by steward shareholders and use those directorships to attract stewards. Moreover, managers can leverage relationships making use of their companies suppliers and customers to get investment from steward shareholders.
Credit Acceptance, a car financing company, recruited people from two of its longest & most loyal shareholders to its board. Rather than looking forward to activists to take board seats, the business leveraged both of these directors to boost its long-term capital allocation strategy, which not merely paid dividends for several shareholders but additionally gave voice to two of its most loyal shareholders.
These tools might help firms target steward shareholders directly and therefore are connected with high time-to-efficacy. Meanwhile, these tools entail low implementation difficulty since they usually do not require approval from board members or shareholders.
2. Ownership tools
Managers can raise the base of steward shareholders through private placements, which entail selling a collection amount of shares to pre-selected shareholders. This enables firms to directly target steward shareholders and make sure they are better over potential dissident investors. Managers may also adopt time (tenure) weighted voting rights that grant more voting capacity to stewards. Steward shareholders are incentivized to purchase firms as time passes weighted voting because voting rights provide them with more say in corporate affairs.
The J.M. Smucker Company uses time weighted voting to grant long-term shareholders more voting power over short-term traders and potential dissidents. At Smucker, an investor receives 10 times more votes per share after they have held their shares for a lot more than four years, well at night average activist hedge funds holding amount of about twelve months. By using this structure has helped the business survive for over a hundred years by rewarding long-term investors and minimizing the voice of the make-money-now crowd that may pressure management into myopic decision-making, something some its peers without this voting system have experienced.
Although ownership tools might help companies attain steward shareholders quickly, they’re difficult to implement. Private placements decrease the scope of steward shareholders a firm can target and the adoption of time weighted voting typically requires the original approval from shareholders. Ultimately, ownership tools could be highly efficacious but difficult to implement.
3. Governance tools
Managers could make changes with their governance practices to attract and retain steward shareholders. The main element is based on understanding the forms of governance practices that stewards favor. Frequently, managers could benefit by focusing more attention on changes in board composition, appointments of certain director types, and the adoption of executive compensation schemes that align with steward shareholders long holding periods. For the latter, the task isn’t so much about under- or over-paying executives, but incentivizing them properly to make sure a concentrate on long-term value, with the proper metrics that prioritize shareholder interests.
PepsiCo appeases stewards with executive incentive plans that prioritize long- term performance, that is what stewards prize. For just one, the business compensates its CEO relatively little in salary (fixed) in comparison to equity-based (variable) pay. Moreover, the majority of the CEOs performance-based payouts are influenced by achieving long-term targets, often at the very least 3 years out, sometimes seven to ten, a few of which may also be linked with ESG performance to focus on PepsiCos growing cohort of socially minded investors. The business also awards little pay by means of short-term commodity, that may incentivize gaming stock prices to the detriment of stewards.
Time-to-efficacy could be miss governance tools because governance changes may take time and steward shareholders might not immediately reward such changes. Because changes in governance practices can involve internal power struggles in boards and between boards and shareholders, governance tools tend to be connected with high implementation difficulty.
4. Rhetoric tools
Managers can attract steward shareholders using rhetoric spinning. Here, corporate leaders have to understand steward shareholders preferences and frame their corporate messages with techniques that resonate with steward shareholders. But managers ought to be careful never to provide just boilerplate language, that is common in the narrative-first approach that’s comparable to fishing for just about any kind of shareholder. Our research shows, for example, that companies that favor more words linked to long-term temporal horizons and connect different non-shareholding stakeholders with their underlying strategies incur fewer penalties from short-term shareholders.
Paul Polmans used rhetoric tools when he overran the leadership of Unilever. Soon after his appointment, Polman announced that hedge funds have a location in society, but room in an organization like ours. Unsurprisingly, the companys stock price took a sharp nosedive, but Polman held his ground and communicated his intention to control Unilever for the future, which necessitated getting from quarterly earnings conversations and targets. On the ensuing months and years, Polman continued to communicate on long-term plans and Unilevers investor base slowly transformed from being heavily dominated by short-term traders to being over 80% owned by long-term stewards.
Much like governance tools, rhetoric tools are of a long time-to-efficacy as steward shareholders will need time to agree with the messaging they observe, which must occur regularly over long stretches. Yet, unlike governance tools, rhetoric tools are not too difficult to implement because managers have discretion in corporate communications.
Using these four sets of tools, managers can create a base of steward shareholders which are sure to provide their support for companies stakeholder-centered initiatives.
Yet, retention differs. Also to be most reliable, and defensive against a potential activist along with other dissidents, managers have to routinely conduct a fifth and final step: monitoring. Governance experts often talk about shareholders role to monitor management, but managers should do the same for his or her shareholders, albeit differently. The purpose of monitoring would be to keep a pulse on steward shareholders to make sure they remain content with management and continue steadily to support the companys purpose and plans.
Monitoring isn’t new in shareholder relations, but many companies neglect to take action well. Companies fall somewhere within doing no monitoring at all to paying expensive fees for third-party surveys of these shareholder base which are of limited used in cultivating steward shareholders.
The approach that people propose would be to apply data-driven monitoring, which depends on carefully analyzing steward shareholders metrics to assess their support or pulse. Used in combination with varying complexity, two main resources of data inputs are most readily useful in assessing a companys degree of steward support. Such metrics may also preemptively predict, as regarding Danone, whenever a management team is on thin ice and an activist could be orchestrating a move behind the scenes.
Ownership in accordance with assets under management.
Unlike indexers, a companys greatest steward shareholders need not own certain companies, as well as certain industries. They often times handpick just 20 roughly companies where to invest. Which means that managers have to be ultra-diligent about assessing their ownership on a continuing basis. Significant quarterly downward changes within their proportion of ownership can signal troubled waters.
The next indicator is really a stewards annual voting. Following annual shareholder meetings, managers often care an excessive amount of concerning the vote outcome on each proposal and spend inadequate time analyzing the direction where each shareholder voted. Whether stewards voted with dissidents or supported management, and if the trend within their voting is changing as time passes, pays to information for managers considering who their stewards are and just how much support they’re more likely to have in the years ahead.
The rise of stakeholder capitalism poses both opportunities and threats for management. Although most discussions have centered on the potential opportunities due to stakeholder capitalism, a salient challenge for managers is how exactly to balance the interests of stakeholders and shareholders alike. Absent support from steward shareholders, companies can easily become easy targets of profit-motivated activists regardless of the companies focus on its other stakeholders. The various tools outlined here can certainly help managers in cultivating strong relationships with steward shareholders that enable stakeholder-centered strategies and long-term thinking.